A considerable amount of research exists on the mobility of teachers within states, but very little is known about the extent to which teachers move from employment in public schools in one state to another. This is not surprising given data limitations that historically have made it difficult to reliably track individuals across state lines. There are, however, reasons to expect cross-state mobility in the teaching profession to be modest.
Several features of the teacher labor market make crossing state borders more costly than moving across districts in the same state. Each state has its own licensure procedures that can be expensive and time-consuming for teachers to navigate. In most states, a teacher's level of tenure and seniority are used in important personnel decisions, and a cross-state move generally results in losing whatever seniority a teacher has accumulated. Finally, the majority of teachers are enrolled in traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans, and teachers who split their careers between two (or more) DB plans tend to earn far less retirement income than if they had stayed in one system. These labor market features generally were not designed with the intention of impeding crossstate mobility, but to serve some policy purpose. That said, barriers to the cross-state mobility of the teacher workforce may be undesirable for several reasons. Limits to locational flexibility may decrease the appeal of the teaching profession to prospective entrants. Barriers to mobility also may lead to a loss of teaching talent when in-service teachers opt out of the profession when moving to a new state.
Finally, cross-state labor market frictions inhibit labor market adjustments, whereby employees flow from areas of relative surplus to areas of relative shortage. In short, some barriers to cross-state mobility impose costs on the labor market without always serving a clear or consistent policy purpose.
In this paper, we analyze cross-state mobility using state-level administrative data sets from Oregon and Washington and present evidence on the level of mobility between the states' teacher workforces. We find that teachers are remarkably unlikely to be observed teaching in Oregon and then later in Washington, and vice versa. The magnitude of difference between the number of teachers making within-state moves (between districts) and the number making cross-state moves is striking: among teachers from school districts located directly on the state border or in the Portland-Vancouver Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), which straddles the state border, more than 8 times as many make within-state moves as make cross-state moves. Moreover, among teachers from these districts, almost 3 times as many make a within-state move of 75 or more miles than make any cross-state move. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that significant labor-market penalties to cross-state mobility exist that may be attributable to state-specific licensure regulations, seniority rules, and pension structures.
Background: Teacher mobility and the Oregon and Washington contexts

Literature on Teacher Mobility
An extensive academic literature has analyzed patterns of mobility (including movement across schools and districts, and attrition from the profession) to determine why teachers move and which teachers move (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2011; Goldhaber, Gross, & Player, 2011; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Imazeki, 2005; Jacob, 2007; Ronfeldt, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2013) . But, for all the evidence on patterns of movement within states, very little is available regarding movement across states. What we do know is mostly descriptive; Rollefson (1993) reports that 10.4 percent of newly hired public school teachers in 1987-88 were transfers from a different state, suggesting a modest amount of cross-state movement. A report on teacher turnover by the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (2014) indicates that 455 teachers (out of approximately 96,000 teachers employed statewide) listed "resigning in order to teach in another state" as the reason for turnover in 2012-13 (about 0.5 percent).
There are reasons to believe that state-specific laws and regulations create significant barriers to cross-state teacher mobility. Coggshall and Sexton (2008) This suggests that a state's licensure procedures can be onerous enough to discourage teachers from seeking a position in a new state. Indeed, 10 teachers are suing the state of Minnesota, claiming that barriers imposed by its licensure requirements are preventing well-qualified teachers with out-ofstate experience from working in the state (Sawchuk, 2015) . Despite this, the issue has received little empirical attention (Goldhaber et al., 2011) .
Seniority policies also may discourage cross-state mobility given that school districts frequently use seniority in making personnel decisions (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2014), and a teacher's seniority level typically is not transferable across state lines. Yet, although there is some empirical evidence on how seniority transfer provisions in collective bargaining agreements may affect within and between district mobility (Anzia & Moe, 2014; Cohen-Vogel, Feng, & Osborne-Lampkin, 2013; Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2015; Koski & Horng, 2007) , to our knowledge no evidence exists on whether they influence teacher cross-state mobility.
1 1 Although the use of seniority in personnel decisions in the United States is well documented (e.g., National
An inhibitor of cross-state mobility in the teacher labor market that has received some empirical attention in the literature is the structure of teacher pensions. In most states, a large proportion of teacher compensation is paid as future retirement benefits, typically in the form of DB pensions that pay a retirement annuity determined by an employee's final average salary (FAS) and years of service (YOS) (National Education Association, 2010). As shown by Koedel, Grissom, Ni, and Podgursky (2011) and Costrell and Podgursky (2010) , teachers who split their careers between separate pension systems will often earn less than half the total retirement benefits that would have been earned had they stayed in one system. Koedel et al. (2011) study the influence of an in-state pension border in Missouri and find that it greatly reduces the mobility of school leaders (such as principals). One justification for these types of pension structures is that they incentivize retention by rewarding long tenures, with the potential downsides of dissuading some individuals from pursuing a teaching career and failing to significantly contribute to the retirement security of teachers with shorter teaching careers.
Features of the Oregon and Washington Teacher Labor Markets
This section describes features of the Oregon and Washington teacher labor markets that may influence cross-state mobility, specifically licensure processes, seniority rules, and pension system characteristics. Key features of these labor market factors are presented in Table 1 . The relationship between these features and cross-state mobility is discussed below.
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Council on Teacher Quality, 2014), to the best of our knowledge, there is no documentation of how seniority is calculated. Many states give school districts discretion about how to calculate seniority, and in reviewing the CBAs of a number of large U.S. school districts, we have been unable to find evidence that school districts tend to consider any out-of-district experience when determining seniority. Below, we discuss the seniority policies of Oregon and Washington, but the extent to which they are representative of policies in other states is unclear. The extent to which seniority rules may discourage cross-state mobility more than within-state mobility (i.e., movement across districts) will depend largely on how seniority is calculated. If seniority is determined by in-district experience, the seniorityrelated costs associated with switching states are essentially the same as the costs associated with switching districts. If seniority is determined by in-state experience, those costs become quite different. 2 The features of Oregon's and Washington's teacher labor market are discussed in more detail in the appendices to this manuscript. Yes. Districts also may consider competency as a factor.
Yes, at district's discretion (great majority use seniority as a primary criterion). Tier One  Tier Two  OPSRP  TRS1  TRS2  TRS3 Membership dates (hired) pre-1996 1996 -2003 2003 -pres. pre-1977 1977 2007 -Pres. 1997 transfer from TR2; 1996-Pres. Seniority rules also may discourage teacher mobility. In Washington seniority is determined by in-state experience and teachers can switch districts without losing seniority, but crossing the state border is likely to be significantly less appealing than crossing a district border because seniority status (and the benefits and job protections that come with it, e.g., from layoffs) is lost. In Oregon, seniority is determined by in-district experience, and a cross-state move is no more costly in terms of loss of seniority than a within-state move across districts.
Panel C-Teacher Pension Systems
Teacher pension systems also impose a significant penalty for teachers who split careers between Oregon and Washington. In short, switching from one pension system to another tends to lower the total value of an employee's DB annuity due to pension vesting rules, the fact that a pension's value is determined by a final average salary that is fixed at a lower rate in the state that you leave (due to both inflation and salary growth), and early retirement rules that reward long tenures. The greatest cost associated with splitting a career between the two states is imposed by the plans' rules that allow early retirement with the accumulation of 30 YOS. To accumulate 30 YOS in at least one state, a teacher must switch states either very early or very late in his or her career. As demonstrated in the appendix, the difference in the present value of pension wealth for a teacher who spends a full career in one system versus splitting time between two systems can be more than $100,000.
Data
This section describes the Oregon and Washington data sets and the process of merging the two data sets to identify teachers who crossed the state border. We identify 0.07 percent of Oregon teachers and 0.03 percent of Washington teachers as holding a classroom teaching position in the other state in the following year. Considering that Oregon borders four adjacent states, the proportion of teachers moving from Oregon to Washington is fairly 7 Teachers originally certified in a different state will generally obtain certification through OSPI rather than from one of the state's approved teacher training program institutions (e.g., University of Washington). 8 The merging process is described in more depth in the appendix. 9 We do not use the Oregon and Washington TFS data alone because the sample sizes in these states are too small to draw meaningful conclusions. The 2000-01 TFS surveys only 70 Washington teachers (zero of whom switch to Oregon) and 70 Oregon teachers (less than 10 of whom switch to Washington). Note that the aforementioned figures have been rounded to adhere to NCES policies.
Data Sources
consistent with rates implied by the TFS data. The level of movement from Washington to Oregon, however, is considerably lower. One potential reason for observing lower rates of movement from Washington to Oregon is that Washington is considerably larger than Oregon. 
Patterns of Cross-State Mobility
In this section we present a descriptive analysis of cross-state mobility and address the following questions:
 What is the overall level of cross-state mobility between Oregon and Washington, and how does it compare to cross-district mobility?  Where do teachers who cross the state border come from, and where do they go?  What are the characteristics of teachers who cross the state border, and how do they compare to teachers who move within state?
To answer these questions, we look at patterns of cross-state mobility in terms of time-related factors, teacher experience, proximity to the state border, and individual teacher characteristics. In each case, the level of within-state mobility (across districts) provides a baseline for comparison.
Cross-State Mobility Over Time
Cross-state mobility is likely to vary over time due to factors that influence the number of teachers being hired (such as population trends and state budget issues), and changes to state policies that affect the cost of cross-state mobility (e.g., pension policies). 
Geographic Proximity
Oregon and Washington are relatively large states, and proximity to the border is likely to influence teachers' propensity to switch states. So, in this subsection, we focus on rates of mobility among teachers employed in districts directly on state border and among teachers within the PortlandVancouver MSA, which straddles the state line.
13 Table 2 presents the levels of within-state and crossstate mobility among all districts, border districts, and districts that overlap with the PortlandVancouver MSA. Not surprisingly, proximity to the border has a strong influence on cross-state mobility among Washington teachers, but it is a less important predictor of cross-state mobility for Oregon teachers. Specifically, the average proportion (across years of the data in the study) of teachers in
Washington who move across the border to teach in Oregon is 0.03 percent overall, but it is 4 times higher for teachers who are initially teaching in a Washington district on the border with Oregon and about 5 times higher for teachers in Washington who are within the Portland MSA. In Oregon the overall proportion of teachers who move to Washington is 0.07 percent, and it is only slightly higher for teachers initially working in Oregon along the Washington border (0.10 percent), and no different for those in the Portland MSA.
One explanation for the asymmetry in cross-state mobility patterns is that it is related to the states' differing population distributions: many more Oregon teachers than Washington teachers are in districts near the border. 14,15 Hence, proximity to the border is closely related to mobility provided that a density of employment opportunities is on the other side.
13 The geographic definition of the regional labor market was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For more information, see http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/msa_def.htm#38900, accessed April 13, 2015. 14 In Oregon, 18 percent of the observations in the study sample are located in border districts (69,830) and 33 percent are in the Portland-Vancouver MSA (129,485). In Washington, only 4 percent of observations are in located in border districts (34, 209) and 5 percent in the Portland-Vancouver MSA (49,521). 15 An additional factor to consider is that teacher salaries in many Portland-area school districts are higher than in Washington, which has a single statewide salary schedule. Teacher compensation structures in Oregon and Washington are discussed in more detail in a supplemental appendix that is available on the journal's website. By focusing on teachers near the border, we can examine the extent to which there are barriers to cross-state mobility independent of geographical distance. Focusing on Washington teachers in school districts directly on the border or located in the Portland-Vancouver MSA, we find strong evidence of barriers to cross-state mobility. Rates of cross-state mobility in these areas is many times lower than rates of within-state mobility, despite the fact that teachers in those districts are proximate to a large proportion of the teaching positions in Oregon. In Washington border districts, the rate of within-state, cross-district mobility is 10 times higher than the rate of cross-state mobility, and it is 7 times higher among districts in the Portland-Vancouver MSA. The disparities between within-state and cross-state mobility are even greater in the Oregon to Washington direction, but as noted above, this is not surprising given the states' differing distributions population.
Another way to assess the disparity between within-and cross-state mobility is to look at how many teachers near the border make long-distance within-state moves compared to the number crossing the border. We find that teachers are significantly more likely to move a long distance (measured as the Euclidian distance, or "as the crow flies", between the centroids of the originating district and destination district). More specifically, among teachers from state-border or PortlandVancouver MSA school districts, almost 3 times as many make a within-state move of 75 or more miles than make any cross-state move.
Teacher Characteristics
Here we analyze mobility patterns across teacher characteristics associated with the barriers to cross-state mobility discussed in the Background section. Of particular interest is teacher experience, which is related to barriers to cross-state mobility associated with licensure, seniority, and pensions. In interpreting the observed relationship between experience and cross-state mobility, it is also important to consider its relationship to within-state mobility. Others have found that more experienced teachers are less likely to move across schools and districts (e.g., Hanushek et al., 2004; Keigher & Cross, 2010) , and it is possible that more experienced teachers are less mobile in general, and not due to experiencerelated barriers to cross-state mobility in particular. To explore the relation between teacher characteristics and mobility further, we compare the characteristics of cross-state movers to the characteristics of within-state movers. Table 3 compares the mean characteristics of teachers making within-state moves to those making cross-state moves and tests the differences between these means. 16 The left-hand panel presents teacher moves originating in Oregon, and the right-hand panel teacher moves originating in Washington. 16 We present a similar table in the appendix that reports the propensities to move within state, to move across state, and to exit the sample (either by exiting the profession or by moving to a teaching position in a state other than Oregon or Washington). 
Figure 2. Level of Mobility by Experience and State
Discussion and Conclusion
Mobility in the teaching profession is of considerable policy interest, but little empirical evidence exists on the degree to which public school teachers cross state borders. This paper explores patterns of cross-state mobility between Oregon and Washington and the degree to which features typical of the public teacher labor market may influence mobility. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to track the mobility of two adjacent states' teacher workforces across the state border.
We identify a number of potential barriers to cross-state mobility between Oregon and Washington, including licensure requirements, rules related to seniority, and the structure of teacher pension systems. We observe few teachers crossing the Oregon-Washington border to teach in the other state. In any given year, less than one 10th of a percent of Oregon teachers are identified as teaching in Washington the following year, and less than one 20th of a percent are identified as moving in the other direction. These rates of cross-state mobility are many times lower than observed rates of within-state mobility, indicating significant barriers to cross-state mobility. The evidence is particularly strong when we focus on districts near the state border. Among Washington school districts in the Portland-Vancouver MSA, the rate of within-state mobility is 7 times higher than the rate of cross-state mobility despite the fact that the majority of the teaching jobs in that regional labor market are on the Oregon side of the border. And in both states, the proportion of teachers making a within-state move of 250 or more miles is more than 4 times higher than the proportion making a cross-state move.
Although we find clear evidence of barriers to cross-state mobility, the evidence on which features of the teacher labor market may be hindering mobility is less conclusive. The costs associated with cross-state mobility suggest that less experienced teachers should be more likely to switch states because they face lower costs associated with cross-state moves. We do indeed observe this pattern, but find that less experienced teachers are also more mobile within states. And although more experienced teachers from Oregon are significantly overrepresented among cross-state movers, those in Washington are not (see Table 3 ). These results suggest that teachers are not necessarily sensitive to the ways these costs vary with experience. More nuanced statistical analyses that control for confounding factors can shed more light on the relationship between features of the states' teacher labor markets and levels of cross-state mobility.
That we find evidence of significant barriers to cross-state mobility should be of interest to policymakers for a number of reasons. First, prospective teachers may be discouraged from entering the profession if they anticipate that high costs will be associated with future interstate moves. Second, the high cost of becoming fully licensed in new state is likely to increase attrition from the profession among teachers who switch states. Improving the retention of such teachers may be a low cost way for states to address shortages of highly qualified teachers in chronically understaffed areas such as STEM and special education. Third, barriers to mobility inhibit the ability of the teacher workforce to flow to states where teachers are in high demand.
As pointed out by Coggshall and Sexton (2008) , although teacher licensure serves a clear policy purpose, many of the barriers to cross-state mobility associated with licensure rules are artificial and do not serve any policy purpose (e.g., high fees, slow administrative processes, duplicative testing and coursework). Lowering those artificial barriers (e.g., by providing better information about reciprocity) could save both states and teachers time and money. Some features of teacher pension systems also may create artificial barriers to mobility. For instance, it is unclear whether pension structures that award significantly higher retirement benefits once teachers reach 30 years of service serves a clear policy purpose. Furthermore, pension systems are intended to provide retirement security to employees, but DB pension structures often fail to provide significant benefits to much of the teacher workforce, more than 70 percent of whom leave within 20 years (McGee & Winters, 2015) .
The descriptive evidence presented in this paper points to several areas in the educator labor market literature that would benefit from further exploration. Given that the issues explored in this paper are quite new to the literature, it is important (1) to document the degree to which our findings appear to generalize to other state boundaries, and (2) to more systematically explore the extent to which the apparent lack of cross-state mobility is driven by the different types of policy barriers we describe (e.g., the degree of licensure reciprocity). 
Appendix: Features of the Oregon and Washington Teacher Labor Markets
This supplemental appendix describes features of the Oregon and Washington teacher labor markets that may influence cross-state mobility, specifically licensure processes, tenure and seniority rules, compensation levels, and pension system characteristics. districts to collectively bargain with their teachers' unions to set regulations on whether and how to use seniority in personnel decisions, but the vast majority of school districts use in-state seniority as the primary factor in determining layoffs and decisions related to within-district transfers (Goldhaber et al., 2015) . As of 2015, Washington is in the process of adopting a new performance-based teacher evaluation system and will mandate that seniority not be the sole factor considered in teacher layoffs. Goldhaber and Theobald (2013) .
Teacher Licensure Procedures
Teacher Pension Systems
The hybrid pension plan that includes a DB that is funded by the employer (i.e., the school district) and a defined contribution (DC) investment account that is funded either by the employee or employer. 25 Each plan has a 5-year vesting period, after which a teacher is eligible to receive employer-funded benefits in retirement.
Several important differences exist between the Oregon plans. First, employee contributions are placed into separate accounts for each plan. Tier One members can place contributions into a "regular account" that before 2000 earned a minimum return of 8 percent (it could earn more under favorable market conditions); since 2000 it has earned the guaranteed return of 8 percent, but not more than that. 26 Tier Two and OPSRP members contribute to accounts that earn market returns on investments, whether positive or negative. Since 2004, all ongoing employee contributions (regardless of pension plan membership) have been placed in the state's Individual Account Program (IAP), which is also subject to market returns. Second, the benefit formulas of the three plans differ. Tier One and Tier Two members earn an annual benefit equal to the maximum of 0.0167 * * and * * 2, where is years of service, is final average salary, 27 is the value of the teacher's "regular account", and is an actuarial equivalency factor. Tier Two members retain the assets in their IAP account regardless of which two benefit formulas are selected but unlike the , IAP assets are not matched by the state. OPSRP members retire with the value of their IAP investment accounts, which can be annuitized based on the AEF, and an annual DB annuity equal to 0.015 * *
. Third, retirement eligibility differs for the three plans (see Table 1 ).
Washington State currently operates three retirement systems that cover teachers: TRS1, TRS2, and TRS3. 27 Oregon uses the average of a teacher's three highest consecutive years of compensation to determine FAS. 28 For more details about these plans, see Goldhaber et al. (2012) . 29 Under TRS1, FAS is equal to the average of an employee's 2 highest paid years. Under TRS2 and TRS3, FAS is equal to a teacher's average salary during his or her 5 consecutive highest paid years. 30 Historically, TRS2 employee contribution rates have averaged around 4.5 percent.
for employees with at least 20 increases the value of the employee's DB annuity by approximately 3 percent for each year between separation and retirement. Finally, TRS1 members are eligible for full retirement at age 60 (or age 55 with 25 ), much earlier than TRS2 and TRS3 members who are eligible for full retirement at age 65 (or age 62 with 30 ).
Appendix: Pension Wealth in Oregon and Washington
Each of the pension plans currently operated by Oregon and Washington have a DB component, which provides employees with a retirement annuity defined by (final average salary) and (years of service), 31 and there are several reasons why splitting a career between two DB systems will tend to generate a significantly lower level of pension wealth than staying in one system. The first reason is related to vesting rules: teachers who separate from a pension system before becoming vested are not entitled to any defined benefit. 32 Teachers who split time between two pension systems are less likely to become fully vested than a teacher who stays in one plan. And teachers with shorter careers (e.g., less than 10 or 15 years) who would have become vested within one pension system may fail to become eligible for retirement benefits in either plan.
A second cost associated with splitting time between two DB plans is that it tends to leave the value of the initial plan vulnerable to inflation. When a teacher leaves a DB plan before retirement, the nominal value of her DB annuity stays fixed. Therefore, the real value of that annuity will be eroded by inflation until the teacher begins retirement. 33 For example, under 2.5 percent inflation, a $20,000
annuity as defined by a teacher's and upon separating in the year 2000 would have a real value of less than $14,000 if retirement began 15 years later in 2015. In contrast, the teacher's end-ofcareer salary, which will have kept pace with inflation, will determine the value of the teacher's second DB plan.
31 Although we focus here on DB plans, note that two plans (Oregon's OPSRP and Washington's TRS3) also have defined contribution (DC) components, and Oregon's Tier One and Tier Two plans essentially switch between pure DB and DC plans depending on which provides the greatest retirement benefit (see Section 2.2 and Table 1) . 32 Employees who leave a DB plan before becoming vested can typically withdraw their own contributions to the plan, plus interest. This is true of Oregon's Tier One and Tier Two plans and Washington's TRS1 and TRS2 plans. Employees do not contribute to the DB components of OPSRP and TRS3, but to the DC components of those plans, which are not subject to vesting rules. 33 Most plans provide cost of living adjustments (COLAs) once an employee has begin retirement, but not before. An exception to this is TRS3 teachers with 20 or more years, for whom the DB component increases by approximately 3 percent each year between separation and retirement, up to age 65.
The third reason that switching pension systems tends to be costly is because retirement eligibility rules in many DB plans allow employees to retire at younger ages after crossing some years-ofservice threshold (e.g., 30 ). Crossing that threshold tends to dramatically increase an employee's total pension wealth. Consider a teacher who has earned a $40,000 retirement annuity and for the sake of simplicity, assume zero inflation. If the normal retirement age is 65 and she lives until age 85, she collects a total of $40,000*20 years = $800,000 in retirement benefits. Now suppose that she has accumulated 30 YOS and can retire early at age 60; she will collect her annuity for 5 additional years, increasing total nominal pension wealth by 25 percent (to $1 million). Teachers who split time between two DB plans are less likely to be eligible for early retirement in one of those plans. Leaving one plan after 10 years, for example, would require 40 total years of service in public education to reach the 30 YOS threshold in the second plan. At that point, a teacher would likely be of normal retirement age and eligibility for early retirement would be irrelevant.
Here we look at pension wealth accrual under Oregon's and Washington's pension plans. We focus on cross-state movement between the three pension plans that are still enrolling new hires (OPSRP, TRS2, and TRS3) and present the case of a representative teacher who begins her career at age 25 and works for a total of 35 years, until age 60. In particular, we calculate the total pension wealth earned after 35 years when the teacher switches between Oregon and Washington at different points in her career. Switching plans with between 6 and 29 YOS generally produces lower pension wealth, and TRS3 is less sensitive to the timing of the switch for the reasons discussed above.
These plots demonstrate the potentially high pension wealth costs associated with splitting one's career between two states. In the case of the representative teacher with a 35-year career, these costs are dominated by the plans' rules that allow early retirement with the accumulation of 30 YOS .
The costs can be particularly high (depending on the timing of the switch) when switching to or from TRS2, showing how the incorporation of nontraditional plan features (such as those in OPSRP and TRS3)
can ameliorate pension-related barriers to cross-state mobility. Teachers are matched across states using last name, first initial, date of birth, and the criterion that the last-observed employment date in one state precedes the first-observed employment date in the other. 36, 37 In some cases, a teacher's name changes over time. Often, this is due to a teacher being married and adopting a spouse's last name or a hyphenating her or his name. In other cases, names are simply spelled differently in some years. 38 This is particularly true regarding first names (e.g., "James" in one year and "Jim" in the next), which is the primary reason that we match using first initial rather than first name. To account for various spellings, we keep the first and last-observed first and last names and iteratively match on all possible combinations. Matching on last name, first initial, and date of birth 35 Teachers originally certified in a different state will generally obtain certification through OSPI rather than from one of the state's approved teacher training program institutions (e.g., University of Washington). 36 Although the Washington data used in the analysis are restricted to individuals in classroom teaching positions, we relax this restriction during the merging process to more accurately identify each person's first and last year of employment in the state by only requiring that the individual be in a classroom teaching position during at least 1 year of employment. The data received from Oregon are already restricted to classroom teachers and do not allow us to perform the same adjustment. 37 Defining the first and last years of employment in this way is intended to avoid identifying individuals as "exiting" a state's workforce when in fact they left only temporarily. Previous research has found that many teachers who exit teaching do return at a later time (Beaudin, 1993; Grissom & Reininger, 2012) . This sample restriction, however, does preclude the matching of teachers who cross the border and later return to their original state during the sample period. 38 Teacher names were standardized by capitalizing all letters, removing spaces, apostrophes, and hyphens, and removing suffixes such as "JR." or "II," because these tend to be used inconsistently across databases.
yields a small number of duplicate matches, in which case records are inspected to identify the most plausible match. In most cases, the first name clearly indicated the correct match. For teachers without date-of-birth information, we merge on first and last name (here, using first initial is too imprecise).
Each match is inspected to ensure that gender, ethnicity, highest degree, and experience levels and age (as reported in the Washington data) are consistent across the two states. Overall, across all years of our study, we identify 477 teachers as switching from Oregon to Washington and 522 teachers as switching from Washington to Oregon.
The robustness of the primary matching algorithm is assessed by conducting two less restrictive merges. First, we merge on last name and date of birth. Second, we merge on first initial and date of birth. For identifying individuals switching from Oregon to Washington, the last name and date-of-birth merge identified zero additional matches that appeared likely to be legitimate. The first initial, date-ofbirth merge identified only three additional matches considered to be legitimate based on reviewing the teacher's full name, gender, ethnicity, and experience levels. For identifying individuals switching from Washington to Oregon, the last name and date-of-birth merge yielded zero additional matches and the first initial date-of-birth merge yielded seven additional legitimate matches.
Although the population of matched teachers appears to be fairly robust to the merging algorithm, we do not know how many teachers we should be identifying. When merging two data sets, the researcher typically knows that all the observations in one of the data sets should be found in the Section (5) . 41 We do not use the Oregon and Washington TFS data alone because the sample sizes in these states are too small
In current the study, we identify 0.07 percent of Oregon teachers and 0.03 percent of Washington teachers as holding a classroom teaching position in the other state in the following year.
Considering that Oregon borders four adjacent states, the proportion of teachers moving from Oregon to Washington is fairly consistent with the rates of movement calculated using the TFS data for the Rocky Mountain and Western States. The level of movement from Washington to Oregon, however, is considerably lower than the average levels of cross-state movement implied by the TFS. One potential reason for observing lower rates of movement from Washington to Oregon is that its neighbors are smaller and therefore have less capacity to absorb exports from Washington; 42 in the study sample, the total number of teachers in Washington is more than 50 percent greater than in Oregon (113,370 vs.
72,035).
These numbers may seem low compared to other figures on the hiring of "out-of-state" teachers. For instance, Coggshall and Sexton (2008) report that roughly 10 percent of new hires in Georgia are from out of state. But, it is worth remembering that figures on out-of-state hiring include teachers who received their training at institutions in a different state, and that many of these individuals may never have been classroom teachers in the state in which they were originally trained.
Using OSPI's certificate and S-275 data from Washington, we identify teachers who are arriving from out of state. Among those who later hold a classroom teaching position in Washington, only half have a level of experience in their first year that suggests out-of-state teaching experience.
to draw meaningful conclusions. The 2000-01 TFS surveys only 70 Washington teachers (zero of whom switch to Oregon) and 70 Oregon teachers (less than 10 of whom switch to Washington). Note that the aforementioned figures have been rounded to adhere to NCES policies. 42 For example, Washington exporting 1 percent of its teachers to Oregon would correspond with Oregon importing 1.85 percent of its teachers from Washington. In the other direction Oregon exporting 1 percent of its teachers to Washington would correspond with Washington importing 0.54 percent of its teachers from Oregon. 
Appendix: Teacher Characteristics and the Propensity to Move
